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For the past two decades, questions over how best
to regulate alcohol and its harms have been
interwoven with broader post-apartheid fears over
crime, violence, inequality, unemployment,
corruption, the state of policing, and social
unrest.1-3 In many respects, therefore, the recent
political and public attention to the role played by
shebeens in driving South Africa’s extremely high
rates of alcohol-related harms says as much about
these broad fears as it does about the particular
risks associated with shebeens as drinking venues.
Departing from this line of reasoning, however, we
argue here that shebeens are not just conduits or
drivers of violence. Instead, we explore their role
as sources of grass-roots livelihoods that are also
vulnerable to multiple acts of criminality and
violence. In turn, these experiences of criminality
may well render their regulation even more
problematic. 
We do not intend to offer a contentious counter-
narrative to the important work exploring the link
between shebeens, alcohol, unsafe sex, violence
and HIV/AIDS transmission4 but rather present a
starting point for nuanced attention to the shebeen
as a complex space where violence can be
perpetrated in multiple ways: by patrons, criminals
and, in some cases, the police. To do this, the
paper draws on a large-scale survey of shebeen
owners’ experiences of crime and policing in
Philippi, Cape Town. It then reflects on the
broader consequences of these findings for the
enforcement, legitimacy and sustainability of
alcohol control policies in the Western Cape and
beyond.  
Clare Herrick and Andrew Charman* 
clare.herrick@kcl.ac.uk
Andrew.Charman@livelihoods.org.za
Recent liquor legislation has centred on shebeens as conduits for crime and violence. In contrast to this
perspective, we argue that shebeens form part of a complex constellation of relationships influencing
alcohol-related violence. Drawing on a survey of shebeen owners in one community in Cape Town, this
article explores how their experiences of crime and police raids are reshaping the dynamics of the liquor
trade amid conditions of poverty. It argues that inconsistent and often arbitrary policing is driving many
shebeens into adopting covert strategies to manage the risks of closure, fines, temporary imprisonment
and bribes demanded by the police. In so doing, liquor law enforcement may have inadvertently
precipitated new types of violence in township drinking environments. The paper explores the broader
implications of these processes for efforts to address alcohol and violence in sustainable and equitable
ways that improve quality of life and wellbeing for all.   
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LIQUOR POLICY AND THE
PROBLEM OF SHEBEENS 
The Global Burden of Disease Study found that
South Africa had almost 60 000 deaths from injury
(half of which were caused by interpersonal
violence) and 55 000 reported rapes of women and
children,5 with many tens of thousands more going
unreported. Alcohol is among the primary drivers
of these high rates of violence, with multiple
studies confirming high levels of blood alcohol
among patients presenting to trauma units with
injuries,6 as well as among women who were
murdered.7 In spite of the multiple limitations of
the South African Police Service’s (SAPS) crime
data, its ability to identify crime hotspots,
undertake last-drink analysis or indeed
systemically record blood alcohol levels of those
arrested,8 the dominant policy, political and media
discourse has come to rest on shebeens as conduits
for and drivers of crime and violence. At the same
time, shebeens remain important sources of
livelihoods for many (especially women) in poor
communities. They may also ‘serve as social spaces
that may create a sense of community cohesion
and provide opportunities for recreation and
socialisation that otherwise do not exist’.9 Such a
counterpoint to the dominant trope of shebeens as
loci of violence is important, because the
transposition of such narratives into received
wisdom has far-reaching implications for the ways
in which shebeens, their owners and patrons
become targets of public policy. Moreover, these
processes have potentially profound consequences
for household livelihoods under conditions of
multiple deprivation. 
In marked contrast to Seedat et al’s 2009 claim that
alcohol ‘is not yet a prominent policy goal’ in
South Africa,10 momentum around liquor
regulation has gathered dramatically in the past
decade. The Western Cape was the first province
to promulgate a liquor policy, with the Western
Cape Liquor Act (27 of 2008) brought into effect
in April 2012.11 The ascent of the Act has meant
new enforcement efforts aimed at upholding
licensing requirements. In practice, this means
targeted efforts to raid and close shebeens in
residential areas as a way of controlling the illegal,
unlicensed trade and its associated harms. These
activities have been overseen by Premier Helen Zille
in her concern that ‘alcohol drives the rate of
violence – that is the tragic fact’.12 In her 2013 State
of the Province Address, Zille highlighted that
The Western Cape Liquor Board has been
conducting blitzes across the province and
imposing heavy fines against owners who aren’t
complying with liquor regulations. We are also
working with municipalities, City of Cape Town
Law Enforcement and the SAPS to close down
illegal liquor outlets.13
In contrast to this celebration of police efforts, the
South African Liquor Traders’ Association (SALTA)
has repeatedly defended its members in their
accusations of police corruption and violence
associated with these ‘blitzes’.14 The perspectives and
experiences of shebeeners have attracted relatively
few headlines, except in covering their episodic
protest marches.15,16 Shebeens provide spaces that
can, under circumstances of heavy drinking,
provoke multiple risk-taking and violent behaviour,
but as cash-led micro-enterprises, they are also
vulnerable to South Africa’s extremely high rates of
robbery. Increased police attention to shebeens in
the context of the Liquor Act has not served to
reduce their vulnerability to crime, but has rather
added another layer of (often) violent confrontation
and criminality to the experience of making a living
through shebeening. The nature and consequences
of these experiences will be explored in more detail
below. 
SHEBEENS AS MULTIPLE SITES 
OF CRIMINALITY
We conducted a detailed survey in Browns Farm
and Sweet Home Farm, Philippi, Cape Town, a
mixed area of formal and informal housing with 
17 844 households and about 70 000 residents in
2011/2012. Three hundred and fifteen shebeen
owners were asked a series of questions about the
nature of their business, their clientele, and
experiences of crime and the police. The research
also included a participatory action research
component whereby eight shebeeners in Sweet
Home Farm were trained in digital story-making
26 Institute for Security Studies
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and supported to produce digital stories about
their livelihoods and experiences, which were
made available on YouTube.17 Throughout this
paper we direct attention to their experiences both
through direct quotation and by reference to their
digital stories. The research sites are representative
of many of the major barriers facing urban
development in Cape Town: low levels of
educational attainment; high rates of
unemployment; inadequate transport
infrastructure; distance from locations of
employment; and poor quality services. Liquor
retailing in the sites is also reflective of
circumstances in other poor parts of the city and is
a direct reflection of historical disparities in
licensing criteria: there are only nine licensed
liquor outlets within the research site. 
The shebeens studied are exceptionally diverse – by
size, revenue, aesthetics, clientele and drinking
style – challenging the monolithic perception of
unlicensed venues within the liquor control
paradigm. For example, 38 (12%) of the shebeens
sampled operate on a take-away basis, not
permitting drinking within the business premises.
Of those businesses willing to permit ‘on-site-
consumption’, the majority provide only
rudimentary seating and the venue’s main
entertainment is conversation among patrons. Only
a relatively small proportion of the sample provides
‘drinkertainment’: 15% have pool tables; 5% juke-
boxes and 6% have satellite sport channels. Over
70% of the shebeens sell relatively low volumes of
liquor, meaning that they never have more than
150 litres of alcohol (equivalent to 16,5 crates of
beer) in their possession, the benchmark volume
for ‘private consumption’ specified in the Liquor
Act. New research has begun to show how
shebeens typically target specific clientele – such as
the elderly, adult men, or youth – through the
provision of certain types of entertainment,
restrictions on the kinds of alcohol sold, operation
hours and door policies. These strategies of
selective inclusion/exclusion have emerged as a
response to increased police raids of shebeens in
general and ‘problem’ shebeens in particular.  
In Browns Farm, 66% of premises reported being
raided by police in the past year. In Sweet Home
Farm the figure was 64%. Given that the majority
of premises surveyed would be considered small
businesses and that women are almost 50% more
likely to own them, police raids have a
disproportionate effect on the smallest, female-run
businesses, which mostly operate from private
homes. Thus, of the 206 businesses reporting being
raided, 131 were low volume sellers. The
experience of these raids leads to great volatility,
with over 50% of businesses reporting that they
had been forced to close temporarily at some point
in the past year to deal with the after-effects of
police raids. These include loss of stock and, as a
result, capital. Raids were far more common where
patrons were drinking on-premises, with only 12
off-trade outlets reporting being raided. While
police raids may often lead to the shebeener being
fined, many respondents also reported being asked
for bribes by the police in order to evade court
action. While reports of bribery did not necessarily
emerge as a straightforward response in the formal
survey, subsequent qualitative engagement with
interviewees noted that at least half of those
questioned had experienced what they termed and
understood to be ‘bribery’. 
Before turning to these experiences in more depth,
it is important to highlight that shebeens and
taverns18 are also subjected to high levels of violent
crime. Licensed and larger premises were
proportionally the most likely to have reported an
incidence of armed robbery in the past year. Thus,
68% of taverns in the Browns Farm sample (n=9)
reported being victims of armed robbery. However,
when absolute numbers of reported incidents are
considered, low volume traders endured the
highest frequency of armed robbery (n=29), when
compared to medium volume (n=14), showing that
violent crime affects liquor outlets, irrespective of
size. These figures point to the need to re-frame
the ways in which we engage with debates on
shebeens, given the pervasiveness of criminality in
poor communities. The inter-personal violence
that can emerge from shebeen drinking does not
exist in a spatial vacuum. Rather, it emanates from
a multi-layered environment of violence in which
shebeeners’ own experiences of criminality inform
their strategies to control (potential and actual)
situations of violence within their premises. 
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As will be explored, the enforcement of liquor laws
by the SAPS is all too often interpreted by
shebeeners as just another form (among the many
that they experience) of criminality and violence.
While technically upholding the licensing laws by
forcing closure, seizing goods and fining
unlicensed venues, a lack of police communication
about the mechanics of the Liquor Act, the
absence of alternative livelihoods for many
shebeeners, and their continued ineligibility for
liquor licences, undermines the perceived
legitimacy of police actions. In turn, this raises
significant questions about how, given their
technical illegality, shebeens should be policed.
Moreover, the paper considers how such policing
can be undertaken in ways that support, rather
than undermine, the efficacy of the Liquor Act in
reducing alcohol-related harms. 
EXPERIENCES OF LIQUOR 
LAW ENFORCEMENT
Experiences of crime and police action are often
entwined in the shebeener accounts we analysed
and, more often than not, the distinction between
the two is blurred. We concur that raids are
technically and legally justified when shebeeners
are trading without a licence, but they may blur
the edges of corruption when bribes are
demanded, due process is not followed, and
confiscated liquor is retained or consumed rather
than disposed of. We also recognise that the task of
policing shebeens presents high risks (especially
when raids affect patrons) and, as many authors
have pointed out, is a task that police themselves
see as unpopular and detracting from broader
crime prevention activities.19, 20 These actions and
shebeeners’ experiences of them are significant,
not just because they are embroiled in the crisis of
public confidence in the SAPS21-23 but because they
also fundamentally undermine the perceived
legitimacy of liquor control and enforcement,
which, ultimately, could ensure the persistence of
the spiral of alcohol-related violence. Certainly,
when the barriers to obtaining the liquor licence
needed to trade legally (e.g. the costs and
complexity of the application, the need to obtain
legal services and the requirements for land use
rezoning) are combined with an absolute lack of
alternative economic activities, then it becomes
clearer why selling liquor illegally is so entrenched
and, importantly in the context of legislative
enforcement, remarkably resilient to police blitzes. 
The digital story by Nosipho, titled ‘I will never
forget …’ clearly articulates the paradox
confronting many shebeeners between the difficult
choice of feeding her family through selling
alcohol, and the consequences of breaking the law
in terms of fines, imprisonment and personal
humiliation.24 Nosipho begins her story saying, ‘the
first day I was arrested was the most painful day of
my life’. During her incarceration, she recalls, ‘I
held on because inside there was a voice telling me
I was arrested for putting food on the table for my
family’. She was selling alcohol as a ‘better option
than being a slave to bad things’. In her decision to
continue selling liquor, she counterpoises the ‘fear’
of vulnerability (from no income) against the ‘fear’
of police detection.   
In recounting their experiences of police raids,
shebeeners highlighted the frequency at which the
events occurred, with respondents raided, closed
and arrested up to twelve times in the past year.
One reported that the police came at least twice a
week, but that she had only been arrested twice. It
was far more common for the police to merely
seize alcohol, hassle patrons and issue fines rather
than arrest and prosecute shebeeners. The fines
appear arbitrary, as respondents report the police
demanding wildly varying amounts. R1 500 is the
standard fine for ‘trading without a licence’ under
the 1977 Criminal Procedures Act as an admission
of guilt payment (which results in a criminal
record) and many shebeeners reported handing
over this amount. Yet many reported being asked
for R200, R300, R500 ‘bail’/admission of guilt fines
before the request (or not) of a standard fine. 
While such figures are correct procedure in many
cases, the lack of respondent understanding about
due process and experiences of fluctuating
fines/bail amounts for the same crime have
undermined the perceived legitimacy of
enforcement efforts. For example, in the digital
story ‘The Bribe’, Lewis recalls how the police
raided his shebeen under the pretence of searching
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for drugs, but, unable to find any, they arrested him
for selling liquor after finding beer in his fridge.25
He then admitted to selling liquor, saying ‘I don’t
have a licence. I live in a shack’ (in other words, it
is impossible to obtain a licence in an informal
settlement). The policemen responded: ‘Give us a
cold drink and we will let you go’. He offered them
R100, which they refused, demanding R750 on the
basis that his ‘bail’ was R1 500. They finally
accepted R400. A month later, police arrested his
wife for selling liquor, offering her release in
bargaining their bribe. Lewis again relented and
paid R500. In other cases, respondents described
the police as ‘stealing’ money, with one respondent
reporting the police taking R6 000 cash.26 Some
caution must be applied to the interchangeable use
of the terms fine, bail and bribe by respondents, as
well as accusations of police ‘stealing’ money from
them. However, reports of being asked for ‘bail’
before even being arrested and an inconsistency in
the conditions under which fines are demanded
(and paid) are notable. 
Shebeeners also reported episodes of police
brutality against themselves and their patrons.
There were three incidents of police tear gas on
patrons within the premises, resulting in injury. In
Noluthando’s story, for example, she recalls how,
during one of the times she was arrested, the police
put her in their van with the confiscated liquor. En
route to the police station the police stopped the
van and released her, saying that they had decided
to ‘forgive her’. They drove off without returning
her liquor.27
Sustained police action led many respondents to
report that they had started to operate ‘covertly’,
employing strategies such as flexible opening
hours, closing at night, or making sure they close
whenever police are reported as being in the
vicinity. These risk management strategies also
have implications for the legitimacy of policing. In
addition, while the majority of shebeeners reported
being arrested at least once, in not one case did this
prevent them from re-opening their business just a
few days later. The overwhelming tenor of
shebeener accounts is of multiple and consistent
police attention, as well as the loss of stock and
money in various forms: fines, bribes, bail. On the
few occasions where respondents reported being
given a court summons, not a single case was
heard, due to a lack of evidence or the incorrect
paperwork. Such inconsistencies between police
actions towards unlicensed shebeens and the
criminal justice system is an important element
feeding the continued resilience of the shebeen
sector. There is evidence to suggest that neither the
courts nor some police are in favour of applying
the full weight of the law, which would result in
lengthy prison sentences (up to five years of
imprisonment), on people living in poverty and
trading low volumes. As a result, despite police
efforts, the status quo seems to remain and
shebeens continue to mushroom. 
BROADER CONSEQUENCES
Effective and equitable enforcement of alcohol
control legislation and prosecution for
infringements would enhance the legitimacy of
policing. Under the current situation, shebeeners
have found covert ways to evade police attention.
This points to important broader problems with
the accountability and legitimacy of policing, as
well as the historical legacies of community-police
antagonisms within South Africa’s poorer
communities.27 The lack of consistency in
shebeeners’ experiences of regulation and
enforcement recounted here suggests very
fundamental flaws in the operation of due process
and the criminal justice system – no doubt
reinforced by the complexity of multi-agency
policing involving the SAPS, the Metro Police and
local security – without which, alcohol control may
never properly function. 
Under Section 74 of the Western Cape Liquor Act,
the police are given broad powers to at ‘all
reasonable times enter … any premises or vehicle
on which he or she on reasonable grounds suspects
that liquor is being stored or sold contrary to the
provisions of this Act, and make such investigation,
enquiries or inspections as he or she may deem
necessary’. In reality, and under Section 75 of the
Act, this means that police can legitimately enter
premises without search warrants if there is an
outstanding compliance notice or if ‘the designated
liquor officer or inspector on reasonable grounds
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believes that (i) a warrant will be issued in terms of
subsection (3) if he or she applies for it; and (ii) the
delay in obtaining the warrant would defeat the
objects of the search or inspection’. This situation
may have given the police and liquor officers
greater powers, but it has also had the unintended
and significant effect of weakening shebeeners’
authority over their customers. Some shebeeners
fear that confronting abusive and drunk customers
(both within and on the street outside the
business) may result in retribution through
informing (or indeed alerting) the police of the
presence of the shebeen. In Nobesuthu’s story, she
tells of the dual challenges of ‘people’s drunken
behaviour towards me’ and the police who she sees
‘as animals’, having broken down her front door,
destroyed her stock and beaten her at gunpoint in
the presence of her two young children, who were
then left at home alone when she was taken to
prison.28 The irony of this situation is best
illustrated by a sign written on the door of Sweet
Home Farm shebeen, situated deep within the
informal settlement. It reads: ‘Khona Beer.
Ungabaxeleli’ (Beer for sale. Please don’t tell the
police). 
The question thus remains of how best to police
shebeens to ensure responsible business practices,
minimise the negative externalities of alcohol for
communities and ensure adherence to municipal
and provincial liquor laws. In countries such as
South Africa with ‘nodal governance regimes’29 ‘the
state police are but one actor within a hybrid
policing field involving the production of
security’.30 This hybrid field of state police,
municipal actors and provincial agents such as
liquor inspectors makes liquor law enforcement all
the more challenging in practical terms. That the
result is often ‘incoherent and ineffective’ is
perhaps unsurprising, especially when the social
and economic centrality of liquor to many
communities is considered. 
Ultimately, adherence to liquor laws needs
community buy-in and, therefore, citizens’ active
participation in ensuring that regulations and
codes of conduct/agreed best practice (e.g. on
opening hours, serving intoxicated patrons,
pregnant women and children) are met. To do so
will necessitate effective public communication of
the rationale of the liquor laws, why enforcement
is necessary and what these enforcement
procedures are. The absence of genuine
community engagements in the formulation of
current liquor policy needs to be addressed, while
the formulation of the licence criteria will need
reconsideration to ensure that small-scale
shebeeners are not automatically excluded from
opportunities to trade legitimately. Not only
should this ensure continuity of police practice,
but it should also help communities and
shebeeners understand the boundaries between
illegitimate and legitimate police actions. Co-
working and partnerships with communities may
also ensure that the kind of micro-scale informal
mechanisms of social control that often exist
within shebeens and described in this paper are
not compromised. Indeed, as Paula Meth shows in
her analysis of the regulation of 24-hour drinking
in Cato Crest, a settlement within in Cato Manor,
Durban, ‘the formalisation of local organisations
[Community Policing Fora] and the conferment of
legitimacy to enforce change can contribute to the
restriction of certain practices, which encourages
the management of crime and social unrest as well
as improving the liveability of a place’.31
Policing shebeens and the informal sector of which
they form a part is a delicate undertaking, but it is
clear that for enforcement actions to be
understood as legitimate and for them to have the
positive effects they promise, they must be
undertaken in the context of community
cooperation.  
CONCLUSION 
Shebeens have been held up in the public, policy
and media imagination as being central to South
Africa’s endemically violent township society. Our
research shows that the reality of unregulated
liquor trade is more complex. We have argued that
shebeens are also vulnerable to crime as well as
more contested forms of police ‘violence’, which
has marked consequences for the perceived
legitimacy and efficacy of liquor control efforts.
While clear correlations can be drawn between
alcohol use and incidents of violence and injury,32
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it is harder to discern the causal links between
alcohol retailing, consumption patterns and
violence (whether as perpetrator or victim). This
article does not aim to defend the actions of those
who sell alcohol irresponsibly, but rather to
highlight that such ‘irresponsibility’ may be
compounded by a lack of faith in the efficacy and
equity of due process and the coping strategies
that the threat of constant raids and closures
produce. 
Shebeens are not simple unidirectional drivers of
crime and criminality. They are instead complex
social spaces that form part of the constellation of
risk factors for violence. However, if law
enforcement and criminality blur – as with those
few respondents who reported armed robbery by
criminals posing as police conducting raids – it is
easy to see why suspicions of police corruption
over bribes, the seizure of alcohol for personal
consumption and harassment run high. If the
Liquor Act is to reduce alcohol-related harms (or
even the total number of shebeens), we need to
ask more questions about due process and
continuity in enforcement. Without interrogating
the actual experiences of liquor control
implementation as opposed to its stated
intentions, our research suggests that there will be
direct and indirect consequences for the nature of
the informal liquor trade. This holds the potential
to compound alcohol-related harms amid new
forms and situations of violence. 
To comment on this article visit
http://www.issafrica.org/sacq.php
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